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Note: This paper was solicited from me as an entry in an introductory multi-volume 
encyclopedia project on social justice in the world’s religious traditions. I presented it, polished 
it up for publication, and then the whole project fell apart for some reason that I never 
understood a few months after I submitted the piece. Since it will never see the light of day 




 The existence of written law in the ancient Near East predates the earliest legal codes of 
other notable ancient civilizations, including those in China and India; thus, through the early 
Mesopotamians, we are given the first actual historical glimpse of law as idealized and, in some 
cases, practiced in human civilization. We also receive, via the Mesopotamian legal writings, the 
earliest recorded answers to the complex questions engaging the greatest philosophers and social 
thinkers for the past five millennia: Why treat people fairly? Who deserves to be protected in 
society, and to what extent? What makes someone truly guilty of a crime? By what authority will 
the state punish offenders? What is justice? 
 An immediate problem confronting those who wish to study Near Eastern law involves 
the breadth and ambiguity of the category itself; the “Near East,” broadly speaking, and more 
narrowly, “Mesopotamia” has been home to dozens of languages/dialects and distinct cultures 
throughout the last 12,000 or so years of permanent settlement. Even so, most of the field’s 
leading scholars claim that we can speak of “Near Eastern law” generally, based on what 
Raymond Westbrook calls a “remarkable continuity in fundamental juridical concepts over the 
course of three millennia” (2003: 4). Consequently, the law collections from the Near East share 
a “legal ontology,” the evidence of which is present in some form (be it specific or in ideological 
framework) in each text. The bulk of our materials come from the Old Babylonian (19th-16th 
centuries BCE), Neo Babylonian (late 7th century-6th century BCE) and Persian (6th-4th centuries 
BCE) periods, although materials referencing the quest for social justice are scattered throughout 
all periods. In fact, many potentially key materials await discovery and/or translation at this 
present time.  
 Nonetheless, we currently possess thousands of ancient documents wherein legal 
materials are preserved and the demands for social justice articulated; formal “law codes” 
(although the term “code” proves insufficient for a number of reasons) such as the famous stele 
of Hammurabi (18th century BCE; hereafter LH), comprise only one important source of 
information.  Other evidence comes in the form of royal decrees and edicts, royal instructions, 
trial records (propagated by scribal schools for academic purposes), lexical texts (“dictionaries,” 
some devoted to legal terminology), written economic transactions, private letters and of course, 
mythical literature. Justice (Akkadian mīšarum and Sumerian níg-si-sá) in Mesopotamia (along 
with its approximate counterparts, šāphat and sedeqah in the Hebrew Bible) entails both the 
alleviation of suffering for the poor, mistreated, and marginalized and the conviction and 
punishment of the oppressors. Thus, the concept of “social justice” in Mesopotamia can refer 
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broadly to any aspect of crime or punishment, for anyone who is considered “wronged” in any 
circumstance. Justice does not only apply to the poor or marginalized, although these groups 
(often represented by vulnerable individuals such as widows and orphans) are often highlighted 
as most susceptible to abuse and therefore most in need of protection; even the worst of criminals 
were offered protection in various circumstances (Westbrook 1995: 158). 
 
(II) Why Act Justly? The Rationale for Social Justice 
 The search for a comprehensive logic or rationale behind the desire to ensure social 
justice in the ancient Near East is destined to fall short of the goal. Mesopotamian juridical logic 
is not “logic” in the Aristotelian sense; abstract concepts such as “equality,” “spirituality,” or 
even “justice” per se are not defined in the ancient literature, nor did the Mesopotamians create 
comprehensive categories and sub-divisions of these categories to address, at least in theory, an 
exhaustive range of possible circumstances. These ancient legal materials, like the 
Mesopotamian divinatory texts, are arranged in list format, sometimes strangely specific and 
almost always casuistic in nature. Consider, for example, LH 25 (Richardson 2000: 29-134):  
  If there has been an outbreak of fire in a man’s house and a man who has gone to  
  put it out catches sight of the private possessions of the owner of the house and  
  takes them, that man shall be thrown into that same fire. 
The nature of such a pronouncement is not that of a contemplative philosophy of law in the 
modern sense. Clearly what we have here is a specific example of a judgment, by a judge 
perhaps, or even the endorsement of a particular act of punishment which has already been done 
and not a case presented to a legislature. Hammurabi’s laws are not merely a random sampling of 
rulings selected from any one particular time period, however; in the form we now possess, 
Hammurabi’s “code” could not have been possible until near the end of his 40 year reign, since 
in the prologue of the stele the king implies that he controls the city of Ešnunna (P37ff.), which 
had not occurred until his 38th year (Bottéro 1992: 165). Therefore the answers for “Why be 
just,” in terms of the ancient Mesopotamian outlook, cannot be found in any abstract ancient 
treatise on the subject of fairness or social justice. Instead, we are forced to cull amongst the 
extant cuneiform literature for evidence of the rationale for social justice.  
 Justice and the Gods, Justice and the King. The Mesopotamians, like all ancient humans 
(or at least the ones who have left us written records), sought to anchor their most cherished 
values in the realm of the immutable (Irani 1995: 2). Regarding the question, “Where do justice 
and the law come from?” ancient Mesopotamians did not rely on what we would call “secular” 
explanations or justifications based on “natural law” or “human rights,” all of which are 
innovations of the post-Enlightenment world. Likewise, equating the search for justice with 
essentially “religious” goals as opposed to other categories (political, economic, etc.) proves 
inadequate since our modern notions of personal “spirituality” are incompatible with the ancient 
cultural-religious milieu. Worshipping the deities, for an ancient Mesopotamian, was not an 
avenue through which one might routinely express his/her personal creativity, relegated to the 
“secular” sphere of citizenry which is “separate” (to use contemporary political lingo) from the 
political life of the village or city. Rather, the ideal explanation for “Why be just” is grounded in 
the divine order; the gods are just, and therefore we will be just (although, on several occasions, 
the gods appear to act in completely arbitrary manners). External powers are imagined to inspire 
the drive and the “religious,” the “political,” the “personal,” and the group are all intertwined 
with one another. In the introduction to her seminal work, Purity and Danger, anthropologist 
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Mary Douglas phrases the issue this way when speaking about beliefs regarding contagion, 
danger and social order (1966: 3-4):  
  These danger-beliefs are as much threats which one man uses to coerce another as 
  dangers which he himself fears to incur by his own lapses from righteousness.  
  They are a strong language of mutual exhortation. At this level the laws of nature  
  are dragged in to sanction the moral code: this kind of disease is caused by  
  adultery, that by incest; this meteorological disaster is the effect of political  
  disloyalty, that the effect of impiety. The whole universe is harnessed to men’s  
  attempts to force one another into good citizenship.  
 Our earliest written collection of juridical concepts is the so-called Code of Ur-Nammu, 
inscribed sometime during the last century of the 3rd millennium BCE (see Roth 1995). In the 
prologue (which is well preserved), Ur-Nammu calls himself a “might warrior” and immediately 
extols himself for establishing a generous set of offerings (barley, sheep, butter, etc.) as regular 
offerings in the prominent temple. The divine patron of Ur, the moon god Nanna, is said to have 
received the kingdom from his parents, An and Enlil, and thus it is passed to Ur-Nammu the 
human leader. Ur-Nammu boasts a variety of accomplishments, which include regulating 
riverboat traffic, providing generous set offerings for the deities, standardizing various weights 
and measures and a variety of other things. Near the beginning of his prologue, Ur-Nammu 
probably appealed to the god of justice, Utu, for inspiration in the field of social justice: “[by the 
might] of the god Nanna, my lord, [by the true command of the god Utu(?)], I established [justice 
in the land (?)]” (Roth 1995: 15). 
 Indeed, Ur-Nammu makes a series of further claims which relate directly to the treatment 
of the weak and easily-oppressed: 
  I did not deliver the orphan to the rich. I did not deliver the widow to the mighty. I 
  did not deliver the man with but one shekel to the man with one mina [i.e. 60  
  shekels]. I did not deliver the man with but one sheep to the man with one ox. 
Ur-Nammu ends the prologue with the optimistic claim that he has “eliminated enmity, violence, 
and cries for justice. I established justice in the land.” A little over a century after Ur-Nammu, 
Lipit-Ishtar (c. 1934-1924 BCE) consolidated the political and military resources of southern 
Mesopotamia and established Isin as an important cultic center (Roth 1995: 23). Lipit-Ishtar, the 
self-proclaimed “wise shepherd” of the land, claims to receive authority from An and Enlil to 
“establish justice in the land, to eliminate cries for justice, to eradicate enmity and armed 
violence.” Kings often took advantage of their early rule to elaborate on ideal visions of 
complete justice and improvement throughout the land, much like a modern political leader who 
uses his/her inaugural speech to outline a series of (often unrealistic) goals and ideals for their 
tenure in office. By conquering and organizing various cities in southern Mesopotamia, Lipit-
Ishtar is able to claim that he has “liberated the sons and daughters” of Nippur, Ur, Isin and the 
entire lands of Sumer and Akkad, “who were subjugated [by the yoke(?)], and I restored order. 
With a … decree(?) I made the father support his children, I made the child support his father. I 
made the father stand by his children, I made the child stand by his father” (Roth 1995). It is hard 
to know exactly what kind of reform Lipit-Ishtar had in mind, or how such things could be 
practically enforced. Perhaps he meant to refer to certain decrees elaborated later in the 
inscription in paragraph 31 (Roth 1995: 32): 
  If a father, during his lifetime, gives his favored son a gift for which he writes a  
  sealed document, after the father has died the heirs shall divide the (remaining)  
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  paternal estate; they will not contest the share which was allotted, they will not  
  repudiate their father’s word. 
The epilogue seals the authority of Lipit-Ishtar’s decrees with the authority of the “true word of 
the god Utu.”  
 Ancient Mesopotamian polytheism fostered a view of divinity wherein responsibility for 
various spheres of human concern was delegated to a variety of divine powers; to neglect 
worship or reverence for any particular deity would thus constitute a fundamental neglect for the 
realm of human experience embodied by that deity. A particular deity may stake a claim to rule 
the divine assembly through promising to establish justice where other deities have failed. For 
example, the biblical Psalm 82:3-4 describes the West Semitic Israelite deity, YHWH, rising 
above his competitors and establishing justice (Hebrew šāpat). YHWH supplants the other gods, 
who are considered ineffective and negligent of their divine duties and is then called upon to rise 
up and “judge the earth.” For the ancient Mesopotamians, it was Shamash/UTU who embodied 
the ideals of social justice. Toward the end of the 2nd millennium BCE, an Akkadian text 
celebrating Shamash was composed.  Elements of this so-called “Hymn to Shamash” highlight 
the role of the sun-god as sponsor of justice and overseer of human affairs (Bottéro 1992: 209-
10): 
  Shamash, illuminator of the entire heaven, who lightens the darkness…. 
  Your rays grasp everything that is hidden,  
   and the behavior of humans is revealed by your light!.... 
  Perched on the highest mountains you inspect the world and, 
   from the midst of heaven, you balance the universe…. 
  You shepherd all living beings;  
   to the upper and the lower regions you are the only shepherd…. 
Another revealing passage presents Shamash as the helper of the oppressed and gives, in the 
words of Carlo Zaccagnini, “an almost complete roll of the recurrent miseries suffered by the 
lower social strata of the ancient Near East” (1994: 283). 
  You, Shamash, listen to prayer, supplication and benediction, obeisance, kneeling, 
  ritual murmurs and prostration. The person of low status invokes you from the  
  depth of his mouth. The humble, the weak, the afflicted, the poor, the mother  
  whose son is captive constantly and unceasingly pray to you. He whose family is  
  remote, whose city is distant, the shepherd amid the terror of the steppe prays to  
  you, the herdsman in warfare, the keeper of sheep among enemies.  
Shamash makes a good candidate for “deity of social justice” since from his daily orbit he 
observes the vista of the known universe and its inhabitants, great and small, king and slave, 
male and female, living and dead. The reliability and predictability of the sun also makes the 
Shamash an appropriate representative for justice, since the needs of the community are reborn 
every day and must be met with continual and steadfast responses (Nel 2000: 145). Shamash’s 
divine offspring, Kittum (“Truth”) and Misharum (“Equity,” “Justice”) attest his ability to 
reproduce the elements of justice and equality in both the divine and human realms.  
 The ancient iconography often depicts Shamash holding a pruning saw (šaššaru), sitting 
in judgment as rays of the sun radiate from his shoulders.  In one Akkadian period cylinder seal, 
Shamash sits enthroned before a set of scales, tipping the balance of justice (presumably) in 
accordance with the petitions of his worshippers, who bring an animal offering before the god 
(Black 1992: 182-4). The image of the scales also played an important role in ancient Egyptian 
concepts of justice (ma’at); in iconographic scenes accompanying the text of the Book of the 
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Dead the Egyptians often depicted a heart being weighed in the balance against the requirements 
of ma’at, represented by a feather (Morschauser 1995: 106). This idea of the scale, of balance, is 
itself fundamental to the Mesopotamian understanding social justice. As Westbrook states, 
“social justice was regarded in the ancient Near East as the preservation of the status quo—as the 
privileges owed to each citizen as member of a family unit with a certain recognized 
socioeconomic status. Where those privileges were lost through an act of oppression, certain 
mechanisms were available to restore the balance” (1995: 161; c.f. Foster 1995: 168).  
 Early in his prologue, Hammurabi associates himself closely with Shamash. The king 
claims he will “rise like Shamash over the mass of humanity, illuminating the land,” and that he 
will “listen obediently to Shamash, who powerfully fixes the foundations of Sippar” (Richardson 
2000: 31). Shining-sun imagery is then used of the king again in the epilogue, where Hammurabi 
declares that he has “made the light shine” for his people, and that his justice will “shine over the 
land” under the direction of Shamash, and so on. Indeed, the diorite stele upon which 
Hammurabi’s legal examples are posted displays Hammurabi as the obedient disciple of 
Shamash, attending the deity who sits powerfully on a throne (Frankfort 1989: 119; Michalowski 
1990: 62). Hammurabi does not claim divinity for himself directly, but he is clearly positioned 
with the attributes of various deities invoked by the inscription. As the primary and authoritative 
living image of the deities on earth, Near Eastern monarchs presented themselves as the 
guarantors of divine justice. Mesopotamian kings, with a few notable exceptions, did not 
proclaim themselves outright as actual divinities, but their role is nonetheless cemented into the 
fabric of the universe, like the idea of the social order and the deities themselves. Hammurabi 
claims to have been ordained by Anu and Enlil specifically with the purpose of establishing 
“justice within the land” and “to stop the mighty exploiting the weak” (Richardson 2000: 30-1). 
We are reminded of the intimate connection in ancient Mesopotamia between the monarch and 
the gods—if the gods are perceived as demanding social justice, the king as the gods’ 
representative on earth must also establish justice.  
 Much can be said regarding whether or not the deities themselves actually exhibit justice 
or fairness in their dealings, or whether the king followed suit with sundry abuses and 
inconsistencies of his own accord. In his important work comparing social justice in the ancient 
Near East and in ancient Israel, Moshe Weinfeld claims that the Mesopotamians instituted social 
reforms solely “to win over the hearts of the people,” and held “no genuine concern for 
improving the lot of the poor among their people” (1995: 10). Weinfeld constantly seeks to draw 
distinctions between Mesopotamian and Israelite notions of “freedom,” the latter of which he 
supposes are born out of “purely religious” notions, whereas the Mesopotamians sought to free 
slaves from their lowly positions only so that they could serve as slaves to the gods and priests in 
the temples (1995: 11). The inscription of Maništušu (2100s BCE), king of Akkad, claims that 
Maništušu “freed thirty-eight cities from corvée and from levy, that they might serve on behalf of 
the temple of the god Shamash alone” and can be cited to illustrate this point (Weinfeld 1995: 
16). Although any society which keeps slaves can hardly be viewed as one exhibiting “social 
justice” at all to our modern ears, we must remember that slavery in the ANE is a relative term, 
and thus was “used relatively to describe one’s relationship to any hierarchical superior” 
(Westbrook 1995: 149). A household may own slaves, all citizens are slaves to the king, and all 
humans are slaves to the deities. Still, outright slaver was common in many periods, as those 
captured in war or debtors formed the main base of slave labor.  
 To be sure, the cultural-religious matrix of the ancient Near East precluded the possibility 
for radical social reform based on ideal principles in most circumstances. Ancient Near Eastern 
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kings, like their modern political counterparts around the world, sought favor and support 
through a variety of campaign promises and official decrees. One method involved proclaiming a 
general mīšarum, or “decree of equity” (Westbrook 2003: 407; Greengus 2000). This decree 
would have involved the freeing of debt-slaves from their current service as a “goodwill” 
gesture, as well as the forgiveness of debts in general. A similar type of decree called a šūdūtu 
(“decree, edict, proclamation”) can be found in the Nuzi archives (1450-1340 BCE) and also 
involves “the protection or occasional release of people who, for different reasons, were in a 
state of servitude” (Zaccagnini 2003: 566). Various other forms of release from debt and/or debt 
slavery also fall under this category. We would be justified to voice some suspicion regarding the 
nature and effectiveness of these decrees, or ponder skeptically as to whether or not they 
produced real social benefits for people. Some scholars have even wondered whether such 
“social reforms” actually favored wealthy lenders (even if unintentionally) by lowering the price 
of land and causing high, short-term interest rates (Foster 1995: 167-8).  
 Still, the kind of cynicism toward the Mesopotamian materials displayed by some 
commentators (e.g. Weinfeld, as cited above, and Epsztein, below) is not warranted. For 
example, Weinfeld proceeds to contrast Maništušu’s temple slavery with Lev. 25.25 (“If one of 
your countrymen becomes poor and sells some of his property, his nearest relative is to come and 
redeem what his countryman has sold.”) This is certainly a lofty ideal, but we do not have any 
more evidence that such redemptions were carried out in First Temple Israel than we do for the 
improved state of the poor during Maništušu’s reign. In fact, the 8th century prophetic 
condemnations of Hosea, Amos, and Isaiah all seem to assume that such provisions (as in Lev. 
25.25) were not effectively carried out. And what of the assertion that social justice in 
Mesopotamia is not done on “purely religious” grounds, as Weinfeld claims for Israel’s laws? By 
what criteria does one make these distinctions? Léon Epsztein also declares that “justice in Israel 
more than elsewhere has a basically religious stamp” (1986: 104). Israel’s king is not accorded 
divinity, Epsztein claims, and the implication is then apparently that the king would be “less-
oppressive” and would remain “a chief among equals.” David seems to have judged cases from 
time to time (2Sam 14), but the fact that we do not yet possess anything like a “law code” from 
any Israelite monarch, combined with the hoary and convoluted debate about the antiquity of the 
sources of the Torah make it very problematic to make sweeping historical judgments about the 
role of Israel’s king vis-à-vis the law.  
 Perhaps one of the earliest recorded attempts at a “social reform” by a monarch was 
carried out in the 3rd millennium by Uruinimgina/Urukagina (c. 2300 BCE). The meaning and 
text of Uruinimgina’s reform has caused ample puzzlement among scholars, but enough can be 
discerned to affirm that we have here some attempt at programmatic social reversals (translated 
by Foster 1995: 173-4): 
  (1) From the distant days, from the very beginning, boatman would take   
  possession of boat, herdsman would take possession of donkey, shepherd would  
  take possession of sheep… 
  (2) The gods’ cattle plowed the ruler’s onion patch… 
  (7) From the boundary of Ningirsu, as far as the sea there were inspectors. The  
  (servile class called) “subordinate to the king” dug wells at the side of their fields  
  and took possession of blinded people (for labor), they took blinded people for the 
  irrigation ditches which were in the fields. 
  These were the practices then…  
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Uruinimagina then proceeds to tell how things have changed, although it is not always clear why 
things have changed, or if the changes are for the better or for the general populous. For 
example, in the supposedly new era, “Boatman was removed from boat, herdsman was removed 
from donkeys and sheep,” and so forth. “From the border of Ningirsu to the sea no one was 
inspector” (Foster 1995: 173-4). Although, as Foster suggests, it is possible that Uruinimagina is 
only trying to strengthen his position over and against the temples, “he is at least a candidate for 
the category ‘social reformer’“ (1995: 169).  
 On a formal level, the role of precedent seems to be somewhat minimal for the monarch’s 
establishment of justice and law. We have only two apparent examples of a clear deferral to 
something like formal precedent, recorded in the fallout of the so-called Temple Sermon of 
Jeremiah (Jeremiah 26.17) and in the epilogue of Hammurabi’s Laws, where the king himself 
suggests that his judgments be used as precedent for future rulings (Richardson 2000: 123):  
  I have written these very special words of mine on this stone; 
  I have set them together with the image of me, the king of justice…. 
  so that disputes may be settled in the land, 
  so that decisions may be made in the land, 
  so that the oppressed may be treated properly…. 
  Let any man oppressed, anyone who has a complaint, 
  come before this statue of the king of justice 
  and let him have the message on the stone read aloud, 
  and let him listen to the treasured words I have written, 
  and may my stela resolve his complaint…. 
  let this stela explain to him the customs and traditions, 
  the social problems I encountered 
  and the decisions I have taken for the community. 
These examples are the exception and not the rule. Beginning in the Hellenistic period, however, 
we see an explosion of citations to earlier law, and from this time forward written precedent and 
abstract legal principles become increasingly important (Westbrook 2003: 19). 
 Justice and the Village. Another sometimes neglected context of ancient Near Eastern 
law involves the operation of legal principles at the level of the village. In fact, this local setting 
provides the most important framework for understanding the Mesopotamian impulse to provide 
social justice since it is the basic social unit (intermixed with that of the family) wherein the vast 
majority of individuals lived their lives. The image of the family unit provided the fundamental 
imagery for all societal relations and obligations, so that the king served as “father” for the 
greater population and took on the burden of providing justice as the family father ensured right 
relationships at the most intimate level of social life (Westbrook 1995, 151).  
Again, we should be reminded that the orality of law in the ancient Near Eastern social 
context is paramount—we have little or no evidence that indicates written codes, in isolation, 
held independent legal authority; one leading interpreter suggests the written documents are 
really nothing more than “protocols of oral transactions” (Westbrook 2003: 19). As such, the 
practice of justice in Mesopotamia was not bound by bureaucracy as it would be in later time 
periods. The relationship between “formal law” and practice was fluid and allowed for the kind 
of flexibility necessary to meet local needs, though in many cases probably at the expense of 
consistency.  
 Regarding this connection between law and practice, we have almost no direct reference 
linking the physical law collections and the practice of individuals or rulers. A notable exception 
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occurs in an Old Babylonian letter (published only in two dissertations) referencing a narû (Akk. 
for “stela”) upon which the author describes wages for textile workers. After quoting a series of 
wages for various workers, the author maintains that the “wages for a hired worker are recorded 
on the stela. In accordance with what they spoke to you, either grain or in silver, do not withhold 
their wages! And when I come there, I will investigate the matter personally and I will deduct 
their wages from the work assignment (Roth 1995: 6).  Apparently the narû carries some amount 
of weight as a reference tool and could be used in an attempt to cow over the transgressors with 
official-sounding rhetoric. But in the end, the real emphasis falls on the threat of a personal 
investigation by the author. The strength of an enforcing personality, whether it be a “judge” or 
the body of local authorities (as was often the case), apparently trumped the effect of official 
attempts at centralized law. The individual judge (whether king-appointed or simply recognized 
by his/her community for wisdom) occupied a critical role and had to possess the proper 
attributes. As Westbrook states (2003: 87),  
  The qualities of a judge included not only probity, but also a heightened sense of  
  right and justice, and a special regard for the weaker elements of society. Indeed,  
  a greater stress was laid upon these qualities than in modern society, and for good  
  reason. Modern law relies upon the absence of personal interest and adherence to  
  the letter of the law to ensure the objectivity of its judges. Ancient judges, often  
  administrators and wealthy local landowners, were not shielded from personal  
  interest in disputes or from acquaintance with the parties, and could not seek  
  refuge in the strict wording of legal texts. It therefore fell to personal qualities to  
  achieve the same ends. 
In other words, the ancient village legal context did not permit the anonymity and “objectivity” 
associated with our own modern legal systems. Ancient Mesopotamian officials probably were 
not able to preserve for themselves the kind of distance from other humans which is afforded to 
politicians today; ancient Mesopotamia did not have cities of millions of people who could be 
separated by miles of concrete or high-rise buildings.  
 Prominent community members other than the king served in the local context as the 
primary sponsors of justice for the poor and oppressed. In the Aqhat Epic (Ugarit, 14th century 
BCE), the patriarchal figure Daniel is observed is his “normal,” “daily” life (apart from making 
deals with gods/goddess and offering sacrifices) playing the role of judge at the city gate and 
threshing floor (Parker 1997: 58): 
  Now Daniel, man of Rapiu, 
  The hero, man of the Harnemite, 
  Gets up and sits by the gateway, 
  Among the chiefs on the threshing floor; 
  Takes care of the case of the widow, 
  Defends the need of the orphan. (Col. V.4-8) 
Although this depiction is perhaps an overstated attempt to show Daniel as the ideal leader and 
wise elder, the role of local officials is primary and the ideal male elder is attentive to the needs 
of those who are unlike himself, i.e. weak and marginalized. This is not to diminish the role of 
the ancient Near Eastern state or the king in providing legal boundaries and attempting to secure 
social justice for its citizens. Rather, we must recognize the fundamentally local and personal 
nature of ensuring justice in the Mesopotamian context. Although some kings are indeed 
depicted as hearing cases personally, this occurred on a limited scale; many significant decisions 
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in and around the capital city were rendered by ruler-appointed representatives or local judges, 
even though, officially, “justice was a royal prerogative” (Bottéro 1992: 165).  
 Practically speaking, there is quite a difference between the direct methods of punishment 
and those who are permitted to carry out a sentence in the ancient Mesopotamian context and 
today.  Whereas modern executions for murder take place with some anonymity (i.e. judges, 
jurists and executioners are usually not family members of the deceased), the wronged family in 
ancient Mesopotamia could take up the task of executing the offender directly. Two stark 
examples from the Middle Assyrian Laws (c. 1076 BCE) should suffice here (Roth 1995): 
  A10: [If either] a man or a woman enters [another man’s] house and kills [either a  
man] or a woman, [they shall hand over] the manslayers [to the head of the 
household]; if he so chooses, he shall kill them…. 
  A16: If a man [should fornicate] with the wife of a man […by] her invitation,  
there is no punishment for the man; the man (i.e. husband) shall impose whatever  
punishment he chooses upon his wife…. 
The entire “legal framework,” then, is not centralized, but is bound up in village political 
structure and the prevailing gender hierarchies. Likewise, the ideals of social justice could not 
have taken on a purely (or even ideally) “religious” intonation since the realities of justice and 
inequality on the village level must have been confronted in intimate settings among humans 
who could not easily remain anonymous or distanced from each other. The famous lex talionis, 
or “law of reciprocity,” articulated with the principle of an “eye for an eye,” acutely reflects the 
local context of law, where both perpetrator and victim were likely acquainted with each other in 
some way before the crime (in a large majority of cases, this is still true today). The eye for an 
eye principle plays an important symbolic role, besides acting as a deterrent, by setting the act of 
injury within the context of personal equality.  
  LH 196: If a man has destroyed the sight of another similar person, they shall  
  destroy his sight. 197: If he has broken another man’s bone, they shall break one  
  of his bones. (Richardson 2000: 105) 
Of course, this equality is tainted, by our modern perspectives, by the fact that the lex 
talionis only applies between equals. The next law, LH 198, spells this out clearly: “If he has 
destroyed the sight of a muškēnum [dependent, serf, commoner—as opposed to an awīlum] or 
broken a bone of a muškēnum, he shall pay one mana of silver.”  The ancient world allowed for 
little or no “social mobility” (on our modern sense of the phrase) save for exceptional cases; 
Sargon’s legendary birth narrative provides the needed justification for such a shift, as does king 
David’s in the Hebrew Bible. Furthermore, ancient Near Eastern law did not consistently 
distinguish social status when meting out social justice, although this is not always the case. An 
exception occurs in LH, wherein the stele makes a distinction between an awīlum (citizen, free 
person) and a muškēnum.  Consider LH 202-204 (Richardson 2000):  
  202. If an awīlum has struck the cheek of a man who is more important than he,  
he shall be struck in the council 60 times with an ox tail.  
  203. If one awīlum has struck the check of another such man of similar status [i.e., 
   another awīlum], he shall pay one mana of silver.  
  204. If a muškēnum has struck the cheek of another muškēnum, he shall pay ten  
   shekels of silver. 
Payments for injury (as reflected in LH, the laws of Ur-Nammu or the so-called “Hittite 
Code”) can be difficult to negotiate—how much, exactly, is an eye or a foot or a hand worth? 
Monetary payments do not solve all problems. Take for example, LH 21: “If a man has smashed 
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a way into a house, they shall kill him by hanging him just where he broke in.” This kind of 
solution is gritty, personal and local. In this situation, there is no room given for multi-year trials 
or government programs of reform and rehabilitation. Rather, there is a basic assumption that the 
households and village hierarchy is sufficient to meet the needs of the wronged and provide 
adequate responses to social problems.  
 
(III) Conclusions: Wisdom and the Vision of Social Justice 
 Despite the confident words of ancient monarchs, justice was never easy and never 
guaranteed for anyone. Alongside the proclamations of ancient Mesopotamian kings stands 
another body of literature that sometimes presents the need for social justice and the reality of 
achieving justice through a very different lens, namely, wisdom literature. Whereas the biblical 
Proverbists are generally optimistic about the inherent justice in the world, the reality of attaining 
justice is often questioned in the Near Eastern wisdom materials, even while their authors usually 
extol the value of ensuring justice for the weak. Take, for example, the debate between a master 
and a slave in the enigmatic Dialogue of Pessimism. This short work, written in Akkadian 
cuneiform sometime after the 12th century BCE, seems to meditate, playfully, on the futility of 
human effort and achievement. Take, for example, this paradoxically humorous conversation 
between a master and a slave regarding revolutionary ventures (translation from Bottéro 1992: 
254-5): 
  Slave, listen to me!—Here I am, master, here I am! 
  —I want to lead a revolution!—So lead, master, lead! 
  If you do not lead a revolution, where will [your clo]thes come from? 
  And who will enable you to fill your b[elly]? 
  —O well, slave, I do not want to lead a revolution! 
  —[Do not lead, master, do not lead a revolution!] 
  The man who leads a revolution is either killed, or flayed, 
  Or has his eyes put out, or is arrested and thrown in jail! 
Here, the slave goads his master on to rebellion; the slave’s remarks concerning why a 
revolution is needed are instructive. “If you do not lead a revolution, where will your clothes 
come from? And who will enable you to fill your belly?” The implication here is perhaps that 
one cannot expect to be clothed and fed properly short of a formal revolution, when clothing for 
the naked and food for the destitute must be taken by force (although one would presume here 
that the master can secure his own clothing and food, while the slave represents one who 
cannot!). Utopias are not in need of insurgencies. But when the fickle master changes his mind, 
the slave accurately points out the high cost of resistance in an authoritarian state. Apparently, 
from the author’s historical point of view, the ideals of peace and justice were discarded 
routinely, and no amount of insurrection or force could change the situation. Thus the master 
moves on to a new idea: 
  Slave, listen to me!—Here I am, master, here I am! 
  —I want to perform a public benefit for my country! 
  [one variant states: “I want to distribute free food rations to my country”] 
  —So do it master, do it! 
  The man who performs a public benefit for his country, 
  His actions are “exposed” to the “circle” of Marduk [i.e. Marduk will reward this  
   individual] 
  —O well, slave, I do not want to perform a public benefit for my country! 
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  —Do not perform, master, do not perform! 
  Go up the ancient tells and walk about, 
  See the mixed skulls of plebeians and nobles: 
  Which is the malefactor, and which is the benefactor? (Bottéro 1992: 256) 
In this exchange, the master again travels a journey from optimism to pessimism, from 
action to inaction, which culminates again in the amusing confirmation of the master’s wishes by 
the slave. The joy of ensuring social justice, through public benefits or free giveaways, is negated 
by the slave’s mockery of human justice; the bones of the rich and the poor are indiscernible in 
the dust. There is a certain element of humor in all of this, to be sure. But the line between the 
silly and the serious is sometimes razor thin, as it is for the author of the Dialogue.  
 The fact that line 76 of the Dialogue (“Go up the ancient tells and walk about”) also 
serves as an inclusio for the well-known Epic of Gilgamesh, mentioned prominently at the 
beginning and end of Gilgamesh’s famous journey, is both ironic and poignant in its application 
to the quest for social justice. As king Gilgamesh’s journey for immortality takes him from 
extreme ambition to an acceptance of his limited role as a human, so too our author of the 
Dialogue moves us through the extremes of human ideals but does not settle for trite answers. If 
anything, the master in the Dialogue becomes paralyzed to the point of inactivity, and in the end 
of the poem, to the point of contemplating suicide.  As Bottéro points out, the author of the 
Dialogue emphasizes the difference between gods and humans, and “stresses continuously the 
limits of human intelligence…we never have the last word, including that regarding the pure 
meaning of the world, of our activities, and of our existence. Others know it, higher than us, and 
that should suffice to keep us tranquil” (Bottéro 1992: 267). Similarly, the reader of Gilgamesh is 
compelled to see the mysteries and even caprice of divinity, and for better or for worse, the 
citizens of Uruk must look to strong-men like Gilgamesh to ensure fair treatment, though they 
may not receive it. Although the deities’ role in ensuring social justice is emphasized in some 
monumental inscriptions, even the greatest mythical materials of the ancient Mesopotamian 
traditions point the reader toward the mundane and yet vital contexts of the family, city and 
village as the foci of judgment and fair social treatment.  
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